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THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE SELF-
EMPLOYER IN THE LAW OF PICKETING
INTRODUCTION
There is a widespread belief that the true prosperity
of our past came not from big business, but through the
courage, the energy and the resourcefulness of small
men and that only through participation by the many
in the responsibilities and determinations of business,
can Americans secure the moral and intellectual develop-
ment which is essential to the maintenance of liberty.'
The recent merger of the AFL and the CIO indicates the vast
concentration of economic power enjoyed by organized labor today.
That power contributes needed support to a union when negotiat-
ing with large enterprises which also possess large economic re-
serves. But when a union engages in a dispute with a self-employed
person or other small business,2 there is commonly an unequal
distribution of bargaining power, and the courts have been called
upon to restore balance. It is not suggested that mere smallness is
prima facie sufficient to allow relief not ordinarily accorded larger
business groups. The -problem is to balance the interests involved.
However, to the extent that a different set of rules governing dis-
putes with self-employed persons has been developed, this Note
will examine the manner in which courts have made the distinction.
The self-employer performs the functions of both manager and
laborer and thereby competes with union members. Unions oppose
this threat to their security and make various demands for correc-
tion, supported by the picket line among other weapons. Although
the United States Supreme Court has developed a doctrine identify-
ing picketing with the free speech guarantees of the first and four-
teenth amendments, 3 more recent decisions of the Court suggest
that important modifications have been made which bear on the
distinction in treatment between self-employers and other forms of
business activity.4
1. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
541, 580 (1933).
2. Self-employment is a species of small bastness. When there is signifi-
cance in distinguishing all small business from big business, this will be
indicated. Otherwise this Note will differentiate the self-employer from all
other kinds of business activity, large and small.
3. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943) ; Bakery
& Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942), American Federation of
Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106(1940), Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
4. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470(1950), Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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One function of picketing is advertisement of the union's griev-
ances by the use of banners and signs. To that extent it is a form
of speech. However, picketing performs a second and more effective
function in divorcing the enterprise from both the supply of ma-
terials and access to markets. The picket line is a warning to meim-
bers of other unions that if they do not honor it, they may be subject
to sanctions within the union, or even physical harm. The view is
therefore taken that picketing informs so very inadequately-in-
evitably in an atmosphere of pressure and coercion-as to be
different from other forms of speech. However, the more widely
supported view appears to be that picketing is a form of speech
notwithstanding its primary function of exerting economic pressure.
This compromise view accepts a limitation on picketing-speech
when it becomes enmeshed in unlawful objectives.'
Picketing is the most effective union weapon against a self-
employer. Very frequently he has no employees who might join in
a strike, or his few employees have no desire to stop working.
Newspapers may publish the union's views but perhaps few of the
employer's customers would take notice of them and the cost may be
prohibitive.7 Since the damage done by the picketing is an indeter-
minate loss of customers and good will, the relief generally sought
by the self-employer will be an injunction ordering the unions to
cease picketing his establishment or his suppliers or customers.'
PART I. EARLY ATTITUDES UNLAWFUL OBJECTIVES TEST
When working men first began to combine in an effort to increase
their bargaining power, there was no reason to distinguish the small
entrepreneur from larger business groups. In this period, charac-
terized as one of "outright repression,"' the courts would give no
protection to the interests of a labor combination, and both large
and small business enjoyed an inordinate bargaining advantage. All
forms of collective activity were suppressed, and picketing was ap-
parently not singled out for special treatment. Since self-employment
5. See Gregory, Labor and the Law 360-6 (1949) , Petro, Effects and
Purposes of Picketing, 2 Lab. L.J. 323, 325-28, 389-92 (1951) , Teller, Picket-
ing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 200-01 (1942)
6. See Jones, Free Speech. Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst Con-fusion, a Constant Principle, 29 So. Calif. L. Rev. 137, 170-71 (1956), Forman,
Picketing and the Right of Free Speech, 56 Dick. L. Rev. 318, 320-24 (1952) ,
Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech. A Dissent, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1943).
7 Forman, supra note 6, at 322.
8. This Note is limited to peaceful primary picketing. When the facts
of a case admit of possible secondary action, it may be assumed unless ex-
pressed to the contrary that the issue was not relevant to the decision.
9. Teller, A Labor Policy for America 3 (1945).
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problems normally concern small intrastate business, it should be
expected that few self-employer cases would appear at the federal
level. An obvious exception exists where an intrastate case raises
a constitutional issue. However, federal legislation and adjudication
has been important in the evolution of state doctrines, 0 and an ex-
amnation of the relevant federal authorities will therefore promote
more accurate analysis of problems resolved at the state level.
A. FEDERAL LEVEL.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 prohibited "every con-
tract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.""' A
combination of laboring men was not expressly excluded from the
application of that law. In the early Danbury Hatters' Case," the
United States Supreme Court found that a union was a combination
within the purview of the Sherman Act; that its concerted effort
for recognition through a boycott of the employer's goods was re-
straining the interstate flow of those goods, and therefore, the con-
certed activity was violative of the act. Today, the anti-trust laws
have little application to labor organizations13 unless they engage in
monopolistic activities outside the scope of the normal functions of
labor umons.'4
B. STATE LEVEL.
Union picketing of the self-employer has been directed toward
three goals: (1) compelling the employer to join the union and ob-
serve its rules - the membership goal, (2) compelling the employer
to accept unwanted or unneeded services- the services goal, and
(3) compelling the employer to observe union standards as to wages,
hours, and working conditions - the standards goal. While this
classification was not apparent in the earlier periods, as will be seen,
it becomes useful with the advent in the 1940's of the doctrine iden-
tifying picketing with free speech.
Most of the early cases deal with the second problem, that of
inducing the employer to accept unwanted services. This seems to
be consistent with the stage of growth of the labor movement at
that time, for the union wished to acquire first the mimmurn goals
of recognition and full employment for their members. Once those
goals were attained, the additional goals of increased membership
10. Id. at 270.
11. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
12. LDewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
13. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
14. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). For
a treatment of tls problem at the state level see Campbell v. People, 72 Colo.
213, 210 Pac. 841 (1922).
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and uniform observance of union standards by large and small busi-
ness could be sought. A judicially created test of "unlawful objec-
tive" runs through most early state decisions.
Injunction granted - Two early Minnesota cases involved mo-
tion picture theater owners who operated their own projection ma-
chines. In each case plaintiff alleged that the picketing was designed
to require him to cease operating his machines and to hire union
projectionists instead. In the first case,15 decided in 1918, an injunc-
tion was refused, but the court indicated that an injunction would
have issued if plaintiff had proved the allegation. The court said that
picketing to force the employer to cease working in his own business
would be for an "unlawful purpose."1 In the second case, decided
in 1922, the union admitted such a purpose and the court issued an
injunction.1 A majority of the court relied on the state anti-trust
legislation, but a dissenting opinion rejected the application of the
anti-trust law and suggested, without deciding, that earlier case
authorities may have justified the result.'
A 1918 Massachusetts decision, not involving a self-employer, en-
joined picketing to enforce a union rule governing the minimum
number of musicians to be used at each performance of plaintiff's
vaudeville review 19 The court reasoned that enforcement of that
rule was an unlawful objective since it placed an unjustified restric-
tion on "the free flow of labor." The justices apparently thought
that an opposite result would preclude injunction of picketing for
any purpose, no matter how outrageous, and they suggested the
analogy of a union's refusal to permit construction of a store build-
ing which did not reach a height of at least 10 stories.20 The analogy
is obviously poor, the test of unlawful purpose bears on the reason-
ableness of the demand.
Injunction demed - On facts similr to the Massachusetts case,
except that picketing was not involved, the Minnesota court in 1912
refused to issue an injunction.2 1 The case appears to be extremely
liberal at a time when many courts were still identifying unions
with anti-trust legislation and, when read with the two Minnesota
15. Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, 140 Mimi.
481, 168 N.W 766 (1918).
16. Id. at 486, 168 N.W at 768.
17 Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, 151 Miti.
220, 186 N.W 781 (1922).
18. Id. at 238, 186 N.W at 785.
19. Haverhill Strand Theater v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671
(1918).
20. Id. at 420, 118 N.E. at 674.
21. Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians' Ass n,
118 Minn. 410, 136 N.W 1092 (1912)
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cases granting injunctions, at first seems to indicate a difference in
treatment by the Minnesota court between gelf-employers and other
business forms. However, the distinction is more apparent than real,
for in the case under discussion the employer was given the option
of hiring several union men or none at all. Presumably he could have
hired a non-union man and thereby avoided the application of the
union's nnmmum rule. If the union then picketed, an injunction
would very likely have issued, consistent with the restraint of trade
view in the "injunction-granted" theater cases.2 2
A lower Ohio court allowed picketing where the purpose was to
induce a theater owner to cease operating ins own projection ma-
chines.2 The court purported to distinguish the Minnesota theater
cases which enjoined picketing by pointing out that in the Ohio case
the owner allowed a non-union man to watch the machine when he
stepped out of the projection booth for water or food. However, the
court went on to apply the rule even where the owner operated the
apparatus without any help, and the case is therefore contrary to
the Minnesota cases.
Where union activity did not extend to actual picketing, the
WvVashington court sustained a union rule forbidding membership
to a self-employed plumber.2 ' The union was listing the plumber in
the local labor newspaper as "unfair to labor" because he refused to
cease working on ins own jobs. The court declared that the law did
not preclude a union from having a controversy with an employer,
even where the employer was within his legal rights, and that the
rule was a matter solely betwen the union and its members. How-
ever, it would seem that the effect of that rule was not limited to the
union and its members alone. The entire community may be affected
by a labor-management dispute, and it does not seem reasonable to
so conclusively shield intra-union regulations from judicial scrutiny
under those circumstances.
C. SuMx.ARY
The early cases are rather anomalous in approach and result.
Consideration of those cases selected was not intended to be exhaus-
tive but is sufficaent to indicate the judicial thinking of the period.
An examination of the cases decided under the "anti-injunction"
statutes will indicate the degree to which the "unlawful objectives"
test survived the great political influence of labor on legislatures in
the 1930's.
22. See notes 15, 17 mtpra.
23. Finke v. Schwartz, 28 Ohio N.P.N.S. 407 (C.P 193f).
24. Zaat v. Building Trades Council, 172 Wash. 445, 20 P.2d 589 (1933).
19571
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
PART 11. POST-DEPRESSION ATTITUDES SOURCE OF
THE FREE SPEECH EXTENSION
In the period between the great depression and the first of the
free speech cases, activity in the law of picketing proceeded under
two important influences the decision by the United States Supreme
Court in Sem v. Tile Layers Umon, 25 and the passage of anti-
injunction legislation.26
A. FEDERAL LEVEL
Senn was the first self-employer case to reach the United States
Supreme Court. The plaintiff, a building contractor who also per-
formed part of the actual labor, agreed to a union contract in all
particulars except the demand that he cease working with tis own
hands and hire a union man instead. A union rule denied member-
ship to a self-employer. The Wisconsin court refused to enjoin pick-
eting designed to enforce union demands on the reasoning that no
right of the plaintiff was being invaded by the union's efforts to
induce observance of its standards. 2 7 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed five to four. Narrowly interpreted, the case held only
that the fourteenth amendment contains no absolute guarantee that
a man may work with his own hands. The Court expressly reserved
to the states the application of their respective public policies.28
However, the Court added, "members of a union might, without
special statutory authority by a State, make known the facts of a
labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal
Const~tutwn.'"2 9 The impact of that dictum, according to one writer,
was to (1) vest the federal rather than the state courts with final
jurisdiction in picketing cases, and (2) remove picketing from the
category of a prima facie tort which required proof of justification,
and vest the activity with the immunities of a constitutional right."
The Senn case describes what the Constitution allows where picket-
ing endangers liberty and property rights. An analysis of the cases
at the state level will help to clarify what the Constitution allows
when a court attempts to enjoin picketing.
25. 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W 270 (1936), aff'd, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
26. The federal anti-injunction statute known as the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is not immediately relevant to this Note. The text refers to state statutes
and cases as influencing the rise of the free speech extension.
27 222 Wis. at 389, 268 N.W at 273.
28. 301 U.S. at 481. Compare Suchodolski v. American Federatioi of
Labor, 127 N.J.Eq. 511, 14 A.2d 51 (1940) ("membership" case injunction
granted), with Evans v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 977, 66 Ohio App. 158.
32 N.E.2d 51 (1940) ("Standards" case, injunction refused)
29. 301 U.S. at 478 (Emphasis added)
30. Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 182 (1942)
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B. STATE LEVEL.
A number of states had already passed anti-injunction statutes
when the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act was debated in 1932.31 The
effect of the legislation was to withdraw from the courts the power
to issue injunctions in labor matters except under certain limited
circumstances. The key phrase of the statute was the term "labor
dispute" which included controversies between union and employer
concerning terms or conditions of employment, regardless of wheth-
er the parties stood in the proximate relationship of employer and
employee 2 If a "labor dispute" were found to exist, no injunction
could issue.
Injunction granted - The term "labor dispute" was usually ju-
dicially construed to exclude conflicts between a union and a self-
employer who had no employees. Perhaps the best example of this
narrow construction derives from the New York Act.3 In 1937 the
New York Court of Appeals held that the legislative intent precluded
the existence of a "labor dispute" when the owner of a theater ran
his business without any employees by doing the work of a projec-
tionist himself.3 4 In addition, the court indicated that the owner of
a small business could avoid the possibility of a "labor dispute"
merely by avoiding the employment relationship, a contradiction to
the express language of the definition. A lower New York court
found no labor dispute when a union picketed to induce the signing
of a contract to become effective if and when self-employers hired
any employees, 35 and m Tennessee, a self-employed grocer who op-
erated his shop with the aid of his wife and one clerk was held
immune from pressure to induce his membership in the union. -' G
The court reasoned that the self-employer was protected by the lib-
erty and property guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.
31. See 35 Monthly Labor Review 66 (1932).
32. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1952). Most state anti-
injunction statutes define "labor dispute" in the same way.
33. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 876-a, Lab. Rel. Rep. (42 S.L.L. 261, 264)(1956).
34. "That definition makes clear the intent of the legislature to subject
injunctions issued id disputes involving or growing out of the relations of
employer and employee to special regulations deemed appropriate to the nature
of such disputes. Where the owner of a small business seeks to avoid 'labor
disputes' by running his business without any employees, an attempt
to induce [him to do otherwise] is not a 'labor dispute' withn the letter or
spirit of the statutory definition." Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N.Y. 390, 393,
7 N.E2d 674, 675 (1937).
35. Miller v. Fish Workers Union, 170 Misc. 713, 11 N.Y.S2d 278
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
36. Lyle v. Local 452, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Work-
men, 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S.W.2d 701 (1939).
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Relief at the state level was not limited to self-employers, how-
ever. Massachusetts enjoined picketing to secure a closed shop where
plaintiff operated a small store and employed three persons not
members of the union.3 7 The demand was considered contrary to
public policy and the court therefore held that the statute did not
change the common law as applied to the facts of the case. The court
then reverted to its earlier "unlawful objective" test.38 Picketing to
compel a closed shop was enjoined on the same basis in an Indiana
case where plaintiff operated a small grocery with a few employees, "
and in Pennsylvania there was no "labor dispute" where the union
demanded that the employer either hire four musicians or pay one
musician the combined wage formerly paid to the four.40 In the
latter case, the court viewed the dispute as one involving the pay-
ment of "tribute" for the privilege of operating. Thus, there seemed
to be no express distinction in treatment between self-employers
and other forms of small business under the anti-injunction statutes.
Injunctiwn demed -There appears to be a dearth of early "in-
junction denied" cases involving self-employers under the anti-
injunction laws. Whether that result was intended by the legisla-
tures when the definitions of "labor dispute" were drafted is not
clear, but there was no apparent trend to amend the laws and plug
the "loophole" if one existed. Perhaps failure to act is indicative of
an intent to exclude small business. A few examples of cases where
relief was denied are found in New York.41 One such case involved
a family corporation which owned and operated a poultry market.
The Court of Appeals, refusing to disregard the corporate form,
found the stockholders to be employees as well, and on that basis
held that a "labor dispute" existed. 4 However, in most of the New
York cases relief was granted, and by 1942 the injunctions issued
through that systematic exclusion of self-employers and other small
business from the application of anti-injunction statutes were held
to violate the free speech guarantees of the Federal Constitution.41'
37 Simon v. Schwacbman, 301 Mass 573, 18 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
38. See Haverhill Strand Theater v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671
(1918).
39. Roth v. Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d
280 (1939).
40. Joerger v. Pittsburgh Musical Society, Local 60, 4 L.R.R.M. 848
(Pa. C.P 1939).
41. See Note, Picketing the Self-Employer on New York, 4 Syracuse L.
Rev. 329, 331 & n. 11-12 (1953).
42. Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry Market v. Heller, 280 N.Y.
481, 21 N.E.2d 687 (1939).
43. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942)
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C. SUM-MARY
The anti-injunction statutes were undoubtedly a great boon to
"tle union movement, but the cases demonstrate rather clearly that
the self-employer fared as well under the definition of "labor dispute"
as he did under the "unlawful objective" standard. Wherever the
courts held the statutes inapplicable because there was no "labor
dispute", they used the label of "unlawful objective" as the basis for
granting relief.
PA T III. THE FREE SPEEcH EXTENSION
In 1940 the United States Supreme Court held in Thornhill v.
AlabanW4 that a blanket prohibition of picketing was invalid as an
infringement on the right of free speech guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. Within three years
the Court made unportant additions. The Swing,45 Wohl 0 and
Angelos47 cases established that the mere absence of an immediate
employer-employee dispute did not in itself warrant state interfer-
ence with the right to picket, but Ritter's Cafe'8 upheld state legisla-
tion which limited picketing to the physical area of the dispute, and
Meadownmoor Daires49 excluded violent and coercive picketing
from constitutional protection. Only in Angelos did the dispute
clearly involve a self-employer, while in Wohl and Meadowntoor
Dairies the plaintiffs were apparently semi-independent peddlers
who owned their own trucks.
Much has been written in an attempt to reconcile the cases with
one another as well as to suggest the inequities inherent in those
cases.zo It is sufficient here to observe that by 1943 the identification
of picketing with freedom of speech was firmly entrenched in the
law. Prior to Thornhill, a court could apparently invoke state public
policy and enjoin union action in virtually any dispute with a self-
employer without fear of infringement on constitutional guaran-
tees. However, the free speech extension seemed to give picketing
all the protection accorded other forms of speech. Thus, before a
44. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
45. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
46. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
47. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S.293 (1943).
48. Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
49. Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowimoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
50. E.g., Larson, M'ay Peaceful Picketing be Enjoined?, 22 Texas L.
Rev. 392 (1944), Price, Picketing-A Legal Cinderella, 7 U. Fla. L. Rev.
143 (1954), Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the Newv
Law of Picketing from 1940 to 1952, 38 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1952), Note, 5
Utah L. Rev. 98 (1956).
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state's police power can be applied, there must be serious harn done
by the protected picketing-speech. The state cases after Thornhill
will now be examined. For convenience in analysis, the cases will be
classified according to the union goals of membership, services and
standards referred to above.
A. MIEMIBERSHI' GOAL
Injunctwns granted - Massachusetts enjoined picketing where
the purpose was to induce a self-employed barber to join the union
or raise the price of haircuts to the union level.5 1 The court found
that there was no "labor dispute" under the terms of the anti-injunc-
tion statute and that the conflict could be treated as one between a
group of proprietors and a single proprietor who refused to run his
business in accordance with the dictates of the group. The court
reasoned that the right of free speech is not absolute and must occa-
sionally bow to other fundamental constitutional guarantees. The
same general approach was taken in Illinois where a union of team-
sters and chauffers sought to recruit the self-employed owners of a
small retail gasoline station.2 The court was unable to find any sub-
stantial union interest in such an arrangement except to allow it to
control the hours of operation of the business. The decision ex-
pressed serious concern that the union could destroy self-operated
business by extending union influence to a monopolistic control over
entire areas of commerce. In California the court objected strenu-
ously to a union demand that a self-employer join as an maclwe
member.5 3 This "sterile" membership denied to a self-employed per-
son the right to vote or hold office in the union, and the court was
willing to settle for nothing less than full membership. In a similar
case the Wisconsin court invoked a state statute making it unlawful
for an employer to contribute financial support to a union. 5 4 Such
application of the statute is at best questionable, for the statute was
probably designed to prevent employer domination of the nion
rather than to protect the self-employed person from a demand for
51. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
52. Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 17)
331 I11. App. 129, 72 N.E.2d 635 (1947), appeal dismzssed, 399 Ill. 304, 77
N.E.2d 661 (1948), cert. dcmcd, 335 U.S. 815 (1948). This holding was ,oi
followed in Collins v. Barry, 11 Ill. App. 2d 119, 136 N.E.2d 597 (1956)
(funeral directors)
53. Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 148, 88 Cal. App. 2d
499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948).
54. Wis. Stat. § 111.06(1)(b) (1953), Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board v. Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 379B, 256 Wis. 77 39
N.W.2d 725 (1949) See also Di Leo v. Daneault. 329 'Mass. 590, 109 N.E.2d
824 (1952).
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membership.55 It would seem that the Wisconsin court has experi-
enced a change of policy, for it is otherwise difficult to reconcile this
later case with Senn decided twelve years earlier 6
Injunction demed - In Illinois" and Washington" cases, the
plaintiffs were owner-operators of apartment houses. A union com-
posed of employee janitors picketed the self-employers to induce
them to join. The Washington court was clear in its position that
the federal cases precluded relief, and it can reasonably be inferred
from the language of that case that the absence of such higher
authority would have resulted in the issuance of an injunction."
The Illinois court approved the reasoning of the Washington case.
In Minnesota"o a self-employed barber was denied relief on the
basis of Angelos. The court viewed that case as authority for eras-
ing the distinction in treatment between self-employers and other
business forms.
In each "membership" case where relief was denied, the ration-
ale was that the hands of the state court were tied by the federal
free speech authorities. In each case where relief was allowed, the
courts were forced to indulge m some rather strained reasoning in
order to avoid the application of the federal authorities. The courts
which granted injunctions probably found that the interest of the
self-employer in maintaining his business outweighed that of the
union in increasing its membership. However, that view is not ex-
pressly stated in any of the "injunction granted" cases.
B. SEvIcEs GOAL.
Injunction granted -In a California case, the plaintiffs were
peddlers who purchased milk from brokers and wholesalers and dis-
tributed it in their own trucks.0' The union demanded that the own-
ers substitute its members as truck drivers and at the same time
denied the plaintiffs the option of joining. The court distinguished
Wold in that there the peddler system seemed to be an attempt by
manufacturers to eliminate the incidents of employment such as
workman's compensation, unemployment insurance and social se-
55. See Note, 27 Ind. L.J. 574, 578 (1952).
56. See note 25 supra.
57 Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, Local 1, 315 Ill. App. 328,
43 N.E2d 198 (1942), appeal dismissed, 382 Ill. 124, 46 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
58. O'Neil v. Building Service Employees Union, Local 6, 9 Nrash.2d
507, 115 P2d 662 (1941).
59. Id. at 512, 115 P.2d at 664.
60. Coons v. Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 31, 222 Minn. 100, 23
N.W2d 345 (1946).
61. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944).
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curty while here no such objective appeared. Senn, was narrowly
interpreted, and the court considered the union's argument an at-
tempt to make "the possible evils of a systen the basis for com-
plete deprivation of the opportunity of particular individuals to
work." 2
Injunction dened- Relief was denied a self-employer in a
Minnesota case. 3 The court was confronted with facts virtually
identical to Senn but the question presented was the converse of
that adjudicated in Senn if a state may constitutionally deny relief
where a self-employer's liberty and property rights are threatened
by the picketing-speech, may a state allow relief to protect those
rights against destruction by picketing without thereby infringing
on constitutionally protected speech? The court answered "ii the
negative and found itself forced to "disregard" any prior decisions
which were inconsistent with its interpretation of the federal picket-
ing-free speech cases. The state's policy with regard to picketing of
a self-employed person was considered immaterial.
The two "services" cases illustrate a divergence in interpreta-
tion of the federal free speech cases. It is a serious matter when a
man is deprived of his right to earn a livelihood, and the California
court placed a narrow interpretation on the federal authorities iii
order to avoid that result. The Minnesota court interpreted those
authorities broadly thus precluding a balancing of the interests
affected.
C STANDARDS GOAL
In each of two "standards" cases self-employers found no pro-
tection." The disputes involved closing hours for small retail deli-
catessen stores, and each case was decided prior to Angelos on the
basis of Swing and other earlier federal cases. The fact that the
plaintiffs were self-employers was not considered material, and the
courts had in reality anticipated the result in Angelos. However,
two pre-Thornhill cases decided under Senn had also anticipated
Angelos, and apparently no state "standards" case involving a self-
employer holds to the contrary It would seem, therefore, that a
demand for observance of union wage and hour standards is not
62. Id. at 751, 155 P.2d at 346.
63. Glover v. Minneapolis Trades Council, 215 Minn. 533, 10 N.W.2d
481 (1943).
64. Glover v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 1392, 10 Alaska 274 (1942)
Baker v. Retail Clerks' Ass'n, Local 1000, 313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N.E.2d 571
(1942).
65. Evans v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 977, 66 Ohio App. 158, 32
N.E.2d 51 (1940), Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 293, 81 P.2d 190 (1938)
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considered quite as onerous as the demands made m the other two
categories. The courts probably were looking closely at the particu-
lar facts in each case, regardless of the labels used.
D SummARY
In the period 1940 to 1943, the self-employer was uniformly
denied relief in the "membership" and "standards" casesea but in
the period 1947 to 1949, each of the "membership" cases resulted in
the issuance of injunctions to the self-employers.6 7 The early results
may have derived from a reading into the free speech cases of lan-
guage that was not used. Thornhill seems to be more a "void for
vagueness" decision than a universal approval of all peaceful picket-
ing, for the statute involved appeared to prohibit even the most
legitimate communicative activities.68 Further, while Swng was not
even inferentially directed at a self-employer, the Washington Su-
preme Court read that case to control the result in a self-employment
problem. 9 Perhaps a reappraisal of the free speech cases later in
the decade led some state courts to discover in those cases what Mr.
Justice Frankfurter later observed in them.
In those cases we held only that a state could not pro-
scribe picketing merely by setting artifictal bounds, un-
real m the light of modem circumstances, to what con-
stitutes an industrial relationship or a labor dispute.0
PART IV LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE FREE SPEECH
EXTENSION TAFT-HARTLEY AND THE
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
In 1947 the interpretation of the free speech cases that all peace-
ful picketing within the physical area of the dispute enjoyed consti-
tutional protection was substantially impaired by two factors, each
of which derive from the legislative intervention of Congress the
Taft-Hartley Act and the state right-to-work laws which take
66. See notes 57, 58, 64 supra.
67 See notes 51-54 supra.
68. "[W]hatever the means used to publicize the facts of a labor dispute,
whether by printed sign, by pamphlet, by word of mouth or otherwise, all
such activity without exception is within the inclusive prohibition of the
statute so long as it occurs in the vicinity of the scene of the dispute." Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940).
69. See O'Neil v. Building Service Employees Union, Local 6, 9 Wash.
2d 507, 115 P2d 662 (1941).
70. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470,
479 (1950) (Emphasis added). The Washington court had anticipated this
distinction and had already overruled its earlier interpretation. Gazzam v.
Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262, 29 Wash2d 488,
188 P.2d 97 (1947), aff'd, 339 U.S. 532 (1949).
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validity from that Act.71 It will become clear, however, that the
effect of that legislation on the free speech cases as applied to the
self-employer can be measured only indirectly
A. TAFT-HARTLEY
It is often very difficult to distinguish primary from secondary
action, and some self-employer cases seem to contain an ingredient
of each. For example, in New Jersey, a union picketed a small bak-
ery to induce the owner to cease using a self-employed window
washer who refused to join the union.7 2 The dispute was directed
at the self-employer, but the bakery was the only place at which
the picketing could be effective. An injunction issued, but the
court's rationale was that there was no dispute between the em-
ployer and his employee, a view reminiscent of "labor dispute"
cases, not that there was secondary activity
Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act states in part
that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to induce a strike
where the objective is to force a self-employed person to join a
labor organization." Most self-employers are excluded from Taft-
Hartley coverage because they engage solely in intrastate business,
but this does not preclude the inferential use of that law to define
the limits of the Federal Constitution upon the state courts. Two
New York cases, one decided before and one after Taft-Hartley,
demonstrate the way in which that law might serve as a shield for
self-employers. In each case the plaintiffs operated cigarette vending
machines as partners. They serviced the machines themselves, em-
ploying no other help. The union picketed at the location of the
machines in an attempt to induce the vendors to join the union.
In the first case, decided in 1947, an injunction was denied, and
the court explained
While the courts of this state heretofore tended to sup-
port the contention of the plaintiffs [that there was no
labor dispute and that an injunction should therefore
issue] the Supreme Court of the United States has tak-
71. Thus, a union may at the federal level induce an employer to dis-
criminate against a non-union employee without violating Taft-Hartley. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952) However, section 14(b) of that Act states
"Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorzing the execu-
tion of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State in which such execution is
prohibited by State law." (Emphasis added.) 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)
(1952).
72. Suchodolski v. American Federation of Labor, 127 N.J.Eq. 511, 14
A.2d 51 (1940).
73. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (4) (A) (1952)
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en a contrary view, and under the circumstances, I have
no alternative but to deny the motion for le-
gal insufficiency74
In the second case, decided in 1949, relief was granted, and the
reasoning was as follows
It is pointed out [in the earlier case] that conduct
of the sort complained of would, in the absence of Fed-
eral authority to the contrary, [Thornhill, et al.] be en-
joined by the courts of this State. The present provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act seem to
forbid conduct of the sort here admitted, and to that ex-
tent renoves the bar to the enforcement of the laws of
this State described [in the earlier case]. -
The second case apparently holds that Taft-Hartley modifies
the free speech cases. Since federal law outlaws the secondary boy-
cott at the expense of infringing on peaceful picketing, the conclu-
sion is that peaceful picketing subject to state law can be enjoined
without violating the right to free speech in those cases where the
objective of the union is at least as egregious as unlawful secondary
action. Although section 8(b) (4) (A) has been unqualifiedly lim-
ited by the authorities to secondary action, 8 in one NLRB decision
the trial examiner suggests an extension of that section to primary
activity.77 The suggestion is unsupported by authority,"8 but the
concept that the section could apply to primary picketing strength-
ens the inroads made upon the view that the free speech cases since
Senn provide constitutional protection for all peaceful picketing
within the physical area of the dispute.
B. RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
A second and perhaps more obscure relationship than that de-
scribed above is the connection between self-employers and the state
right-to-work laws. These statutes derive validity from Taft-Hart-
ley,79 and usually express the policy that no person shall be denied
the right to work because of membership or non-membership in a
74. Lo Bianco v. Holt, 189 Misc. 113, 114, 70 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (Sup.
Ct 1947).
75. Sweeney v. Goolst, 91 N.Y.S2d 579, 580 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (Emphasis
added). But see Schwartz v. Schwartz, 36 L.R.R.M. 2064 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1955), where the court denied relief to a self-employed window washer whose
customers were being picketed. The court followed Lo Bianco, note 74 supra,
without making any reference to Sweeney.
76. See Note, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 452, 473 (1957).
77. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Lakeview Creamery
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 601 (1953).
78: See note 76 supra.
79. See note 71 supra.
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labor union.8" None of the state statutes are directed expressly at
the self-employer."' That Congress excluded independent contrac-
tors8 2 from the purview of Taft-Hartley does not seem to prevent
the states from including such persons in their right-to-work laws,
but apparently none has done so expressly
There appears to be no square holding on the relationship of
a self-employer to the right-to-work legislation. However, the Ala-
bama court casts some doubt on the applicability of the statutes to
self-employed persons.8 3 A union sought to recover its "shop card"
which designates a barber shop as union approved. Loss to a barber
of his card was usually followed by a substantial decrease in busi-
ness. The self-employer had refused to return the card, and instead
of picketing his shop, the union asked the court for an order forcing
compliance. The self-employer invoked the state right-to-work law,
but the court pointed out that the shop card agreement was made
prior to passage of the law and that the statute contained a saving
clause which upheld the validity of such prior contracts.8' The court
then went on to say by way of dictum "However, we would not
be understood as holding that it would apply to the instaiit cast,
even in the absence of [the saving clause] "85
Another court implies that the right-to-work statutes are applic-
able to self-employers .8  The union was picketing to induce the
acceptance by the employer of a "one-owner" clause, which made
all persons other than the single owner subject to the terms of eiii-
ployment normally applied only to employees. The decision noted
that
By this means, the union would prevent a man and
wife, or two partners from both working unless one of
them paid the union an assessment This would be
a violation of the right of a man to engage freely
in private enterprise without undue hindrance.
8 7
While the right-to-work statute was not expressly applied, the
policy stated by the court seems to justify an inference of applica-
bility
80. E.g., Ala. Code Ann. tit. 26, § 375(1-7) (Supp. 1956), Ga. Code
Ann. § 54-901 (Supp. 1955).
81. The laws deal with the term "employment." E.g., Ala. Code Ann.
tit. 26, § 375(1) (Supp. 1956) , Ga. Code Ann. § 54-902 (Supp. 1955)
82. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1952).
83. Head v. Local Union 83, Journeymen Barbers Union, 262 Ala. 84, 77
So.2d 363 (1955).
84. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 26, § 375(7) (Supp. 1956)
85. Head v. Local Union 83, Journeymen Barbers Union, 262 Ala.
84, 90, 77 So.2d 363, 368 (1955) (Emphasis added).
86. Arizona Flame Restaurant v. Bartenders Union, 34 L.R.R.M. 2707
(Ariz. Super. Ct. 1954).
87 Id. at 2709.
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The two cases just considered do not settle the question whether
a self-employer can invoke the right-to-work laws against a union
demand that he join, but two arguments supporting that interpreta-
tion can be advanced- First, while every barber shop case decided
since 1946 in states having no right-to-work statute concerned a
demand that the self-employer join the union,88 neither of two bar-
ber shop cases decided in right-to-work states turned on that
demand.8 9 The union changed its strategy and merely sought the
return of their shop cards. The change in union strategy suggests
the possibility that the union feared that attempted picketing to force
a self-employer's membership would have been declared violative of
the right-to-work law. The union's apprehension would seem justi-
fied, for the above quoted dictum of the Alabama court, expressing
doubt as to the applicability of the statute, was probably limited to
a union action for the recovery of a shop card and would not extend
to a suit by the self-employer to enjoin picketing designed to force
him to join the union.90 Finally, if the policy of a state is to allow
freedom of choice to a person who works for someone else, then
there is greater reason for allowing that freedom of choice to a self-
employer because he does the work of an employee and in addition
supplies the capital required to carry on his activity
PART V JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF THE FREE SPEECH
EXTENSION THE COMmIUNITY INTEREST TEsT
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,"' decided by the Supreme
Court in 1949 after six years of silence on the picketing question,
affirmed a state court injunction of picketing which would have
forced the employer to violate a state anti-trust law. The Court
88. Di Leo v. Daneault, 329 Mass. 590, 109 N.E.2d 824 (1952), Simon
v. Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 315, 21 N.J. Super. 65, 90 A.2d 753
(1952) ; Fouttes v. Journeymen Barbers Umon, Local 105, 155 Oluo St. 573,
99 N.E2d 782 (1951), Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Journey-
men Barbers Union, Local 379B, 256 Wis. 77,39 N.W.2d 725 (1949), Riviello
v. Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 148, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400
(1948), Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.F.2d 12 (1947), Coons v.
Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 31, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W.2d 345 (1946).
But see Journeymen Barbers Union, Local 687 v. Pollino, 22 N.J. 389, 126
A2d 194 (1956).
89. Head v. Local Union 83, Journeymen Barbers Union, 262 Ala. 84.
77 So.2d 363 (1955), Rainwater v. Trimble, 207 Ga. 306, 61 S.E.2d 420
(1950).
90. See note 87 supra. In Flatt v. Barbers Union, 39 L.RR.M. 2585
(Tenn. 1957), the court upheld the union's contention that the picketing was
designed to induce observance of its standards. A dissenting opinion applied
the state right-to-work law- the union's motive ivas to coerce the self-
employer to join. Id. at 2587
91. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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made it clear that the constitutional protection afforded picketing
did not extend to cases in which the objective of the picketing was
unlawful. In quick order the Court affirmed Gazzam 92 and Hughes-
where the state courts had enjoined picketing designed respectively
to induce a closed shop agreement and employment discrimination
in favor of Negroes. The Court then decided Internatwnal Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Hanke9 4 The Washington court had enjoined
picketing designed to force self-employed auto dealers to join the
union or comply with the union's hour and day standards. The
theory was that the union's interest in the welfare of its members
was outweighed by the interest of the individual proprietor and the
community as a whole small businessmen and property owners
should be free from dictation with respect to business policy from
outside groups having only a small and indirect interest in that
policy.9 5 The Supreme Court approved the "community interest"
test and stated that the Court would not inquire into state policy
Since both state courts and Congress had declared the objective of
forced membership unlawful, the Court reasoned that the Washing-
ton decision could not be "so inconsistent with rooted traditions of
a free people that it must be found an unconstitutional choice."90
A. THE FREE SPEECH CASES NEW V OLD
Whether the analyst accepts the union's version in Hanke that
it wanted only the observance of its hour and day standard or the
owner's version that membership was demanded, Hanke, together
with the other new cases, may be interpreted in two ways. First, the
argument is made that the picketing-free speech doctrine has been
abandoned or substantially impaired.97 The proponents of this view
point out that under Thornhill, picketing-speech was equated with
other forms of speech, but under Hanke, picketing may be enjoined
whenever a state legislature, Congress, or the courts declare the
objective unlawful.
According to the opposing view, the cases can be reconciled by
limiting them to their narrow holdings. 8 Thus, Thornhill outlawed
a vague blanket prohibition on all picketing and would very likely
92. Gazzam v. Building Service Employees International Union, Local
262, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
93. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950)
94. 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
95. 33 Wash.2d 646, 659, 207 P.2d 206, 213 (1949).
96. 339 U.S. at 478.
97. See note 50 supra.
98. Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alasl Amidst Confusion,
a Constant Principle, 29 So. Calif. L. Rev. 137, 149-160 (1956), Note, 27 Ind.
L.J. 574, 584 (1952).
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be decided the same way today. In Swing, the state court attempted
to limit a "labor dispute' to controversies between an employer and
lus employees, and the Supreme Court answered that the economic
relationship between employer and "stranger" union was close
enough to fall within the protection of the Constitution. In Wohl
the peddler system seemed to be a calculated attempt by manufac-
turers to nd themselves of the recognized legitimate incidents of
the -employment relationship such as the state workman's compen-
sation law: In Angelos the partnership formed between the em-
ployer and Ins former employees after the picketing began was more
apparent than real, and the New York courts erroneously made the
"sham" agreement the basis for finding the absence of a "labor dis-
pute." In each of the above cases, the Supreme Court held only that
an injunction must satisfy the Federal Constitution as well as state
statutes before the remedy could issue. On the other hand, the pick-
eting in Giboney would have induced the violation of state anti-trust
legislation, and in Hughes, the violation of state policy against racial
discrimination. Since the Court allowed the abridgment of picketing
when its effect would be to violate a state's policy as announced by
the legislature, it would be consistent to treat the state's policy as
announced by the courts the same way, as was done in Hanke.
Aside from the problem of reconciling the new and old cases,
there is disagreement as to the correctness of the Hanke decision in
terms of constitutional requirements. The proponents of picketing
as a form of speech would concur with Mr. Justice Minton, dis-
senting m Hanke"
[A]s long as Wisconsin [in Semi] allowed picketing,
there was no interfeience with freedom of expression
. but because Wisconsin could permit picketing, and
not thereby encroach upon freedom of speech, it does
not follow that it can forbid like picketing; for that
might involve conflict with the Fourteenth AmendmentY
That statement implies that under the Constitution the right to
hold and enjoy property is subservient to the right of free speech,
a view which has some support in other free speech problems not
involving picketing.100 However, the logical extreme of that view
as applied to the law of picketing - that free speech rights are supe-
rior in all cases to property rights and that picketing is an absolute
expression of that superior right - appears to be as irrational as
the converse of that reasoning.
99. 339 U.S. at 481, 483.
100. See Meikeljohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Slf-Government
xi, 93-4 (1948).
19571 ,VOTES
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The federal free speech cases must be interpreted in the light of
the state cases decided both prior to and after Thornhill. Before
Ttwrnhill, the states proscribed picketing-in many cases by labelling
as unlawful those union goals seemingly legitimate. In the period
1937 to 1943 the Court decided that as picketing has an ingredient
of speech, it has roots in the Federal Constitution and is thus enti-
tled to the protection commonly accorded free speech. Thus, the
limitations placed on picketing by the states were too narrow, and
the Court was merely extending them. In the period 1949 to 1950
the Court decided that free speech rights must be balanced with the
right of self-determinism the fourteenth amendment does not ac-
cord labor a preferred position, the rights and interests of the whole
community must be considered. Although the decisions could be
made inconsistent through extreme interpretation, perhaps the bet-
ter view is that the Supreme Court recognized that under the early
cases the pendulum had swung too far and that the state courts were
now denying relief wherever the picketing was peacefully carried on.
The Court split five to three in Hanke, and it was suggested that
the case may not be followed because it had sanctioned an unwork-
able standard.' 0 ' However, a survey of the cases decided after Han-
ke shows that the "community interest" test has been an important
factor in state court results. Those cases will now be examined.
B STATE COURT TREATMENT AFTER HANKE
Membership goal - Self-employed barbers had already been
subject to union membership campaigns before Hanke was decid-
ed.10 2 A number of inconsistent cases arose after Hanke. An in-
junction against picketing was issued in New Jersey because by
joining the barber union, the self-employer would be required by
the constitution of that union to resign from membership in a pro-
fessional association.103 The court designated this denial of dual
membership together with its attendant loss of benefits as ain unlaw-
ful objective of the picketing.
A change in union strategy brought about interesting results in
other barber shop disputes. Instead of demanding the self-employer's
membership in the union, the latter offered an option either join
the union or return the union "shop card" which designates the
101. See Starr v. Cooks Union, Local 458, 244 Minn. 558, 566, 70 N.V.2d
873, 878 (1955), Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New
Law of Picketing from 1940 to 1952, 38 Cornell L.Q. 1, 48 (1952).
102. See notes 51, 54, 60 .rupra.
103. Simon v. Journeymen Barbers Union. Local 315, 21 N.J. Super.
65, 90 A.2d 753 (1952)
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business as union approved. Since the loss of the card usually re-
sulted in a. substantial decrease of business,10' the demand was really
an indirect way of inducing membership. Massachusetts refused to
order the return of the card to the umon,105 but Georgiaa1' and
Alabama20 7 held contrary. The difference in result can be attributed
to the fact that while the former court looked to the motives behind
the demand, the two southern courts considered the shop cards to
be union property which was loaned to the proprietors subject to
revocation. In Alabama the "shop card" agreement was effective
before passage of the state right-to-work law, and that statute could
not apply .," The right-to-work law was not put in issue in the
Georgia case.
Picketing to induce membership in the union is not always
directed solely at the self-employer; in many cases it is more prac-
tical to picket his customers and suppliers. This secondary activity
has been outlawed at the federal level by the Taft-Hartley Act.210
In 'Wisconsin a self-employed window washer gained an injunction
against picketing directed at his customers.11  The court relied on
Hanke to the extent that the decision allowed the result to rest on
state policy. The decision was cast in the language of "labor dis-
pute", and unlawful secondary action was not put in issue. In two
other cases the owners of restaurants allowed a self-employed non-
union man to install and service coin-operated music boxes, there
being a division of the proceeds between the two parties. One court
treated the arrangement to divide the profits as a joint enterprise
thereby eliminating the possibility of a secondary boycott. An in-
junction was refused."1 The other court allowed an injunction, rea-
soning as follows since the machine owner-servicer was a self-
employer, primary picketing was unlawful under the state's applica-
tion of the Hanke standard, since primary picketing was unlawful,
secondary activity must also be unlawful. The court therefore neatly
sidestepped the union's argument that primary picketing of a self-
employer was not involved1 12
104. Loss of business varied from _20% to 50%. See Ramnwater v. Trim-
ble, 207 Ga. 306, 61 S.E.2d 420 (1950).
105. Di Leo v. Daneault, 329 Mass. 590, 109 N..2d 824 (1952).
106. Rainwater v. Trimble, 207 Ga. 306, 61 S.E.2d 420 (1950).
107. Head v. Local Union 83, Journeymen Barbers Union, 262 Ala. 84,
77 So.2d 363 (1955).
108. See note 84 supra.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952).
110. Brown v. Sucher, 258 Wis. 123, 45 N.Wv27d 73 (1950).
111. Nicholson v. Vending Machine Service Employees Union, Local
410-A, 63 Ohio Law Abst. 19, 104 N.E2d 473 (1952).
112. Wischhusen v. Griffin, 32 L.R.R.M. 2426 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1953).
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Only in the case last discussed did a court expressly innunize
a self-employer from forced union membership. In the other cases,
the courts relied on the presence or absence of a "labor dispute", on
an evaluation of union motives, or on the strained application of
state statutes. The courts did not, therefore, need to consider the
application of the "community interest" test, and this probably ex-
plains the absence in the state "membership" opinions of the nor-
mally extensive evaluation of the old and new picketing-free speech
cases.
Serznces goal - The problem of the motion picture theater own-
er who operates his own projection machines came up in several
cases after Hanke. A New York court refused an injunction but
indicated that an injunction would issue if plaintiff could prove
that the picketing was designed to induce him to accept unwanted
and unneeded services. 11 In Missouri"14 and Pennsylvania'" in-
junctions were issued where the union's demand if effectuated would
have made operation of the business uneconomical. In the fourth
case, the union contended that a partnership agreement was a "stud-
ied attempt to avoid the responsibilities and obligations of an em-
ployer-employee relationship."" 0 However, the court accepted the
trial judge's conclusions to the contrary and granted relief after
weighing the interests under the Hanke standard. The majority in-
cluded in their considerations the fact that the self-employer was
denied the right to join the union, but two concurring judges la-
belled that fact immaterial."'
The "services" cases are important for the emphasis they place
on the "oppressive" nature of the union's activity It should be re-
called that the self-employer in Senn and the peddlers in Wohl were
subject to similar hardship, but the right of free speech was con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in those cases to be of greater
weight." 8 The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that the Hanke
standard as interpreted by the state courts allows more freedom in
balancing the interests in the "services" cases.
Standards goal - A lower Colorado court refused relief to a
small grocer where the union was picketing to force compliance
113. Bellisario v. Lackey, 99 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
114. Graham v. Blust, 34 L.R.R.M. 2506 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1954).
115. Thomson v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, Local 287,
34 L.R.R.M. 2393 (Pa. C.P 1954).
116. Heath v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, Local 170,
290 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1956).
117 Id. at 160.
118. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) , Seul v.
Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937)
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with its maximum hour and day standard.119 The court pointed out
that injunction was an extraordinary remedy and that "injunctive
process has for its pole star that freedom is generally the accepted
thing and restraint the exception."'12 0 While Hanke was interpreted
to allow the decision to rest on state policy, the court found that
since the legislature had not spoken on the matter, the weight of
authority in the "hour and day" cases precluded relief. Thus, in-
junctive relief for the self-employer in the "standards" cases will
presumably be obtained only through legislative action, each court
being inclined to follow emsting precedents.12'
It seems to be quite clear from a reading of the state cases in
all three categories that, after Hanke, injunctions were not denied
merely because it was thought the Federal Constitution precluded
their issuance, as was the case with many post-Thornhill but pre-
Gibonwy decisions. Rather, the post-Hanke cases rest on interpreta-
tion of state policy. However, recognition by one court of an-"al-
most violent judicial trend toward complete disassociation of picket-
ing from the right of free speech" " seems rather premature.
CONCLUSIONS
Few will doubt that the "community interest" test imparts much
more flexibility into the law than the "unlawful objectives" label
or the free speech standard. The problem is whether a more flexible
standard is desirable.
In those states which have been slow to welcome the inroads of
organized labor, the flexible standard may appear somewhat omi-
nous to the union, for under Hanke the state may find it both wise
and constitutionally possible to immunize the small businessman
from union demands and thereby withdraw from labor a large
source of future membership and income. That view may be quite
persuasive, but it seems premature for two reasons (1) constitu-
tional protection of picketing is still available under the latest pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court, for the Court has neither said
nor inplied otherwise, (2) the Hanke case allows for balancing
those constitutional guarantees, not disregarding them. Thus, be-
119. Rubenstone v. Meat Cutters Union, Local 634, AFL, 34 L.R.R.M.
2179 (Colo. Dist. Ct 1954).
120. Id. at 2180.
121. See Flatt v. Barbers Umon, 39 L.R.R.M. 2585 (Tenm. 1957),
where the court interpreted the union's purpose to be the "standards" goal
rather than the "membership" goal. In this way the court wvas able to avoid the
application of the state right-to-work law.
122. Arizona Flame Restaurant v. Bartenders Union, 34 L.R.R.M. 2707,
27710 (Arz. Super. Ct. 1954).
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hind the "community interest" test is the rationale of reasonableness
under the specific circumstances.
In the few years since Hanke, there has been little express lan-
guage in the state cases indicating that the courts have accepted the
standard and are balancing the interests involved, but it seems that
the courts are in effect applying that standard without expressly
stating it. The following factors should be weighed to determine
whether relief will be granted (1) the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech, (2) the constitutional guarantees of the right
to hold and enjoy property, (3) the importance to the union of
obtaining its objective, (4) the importance to the economy of en-
couraging the self-employer, and (5) the extent to which the
picketing is merely informative as opposed to coercive. 2
It has been suggested that the Hanke standard could turn the
law into a "highly personalized equation devoid of standards in the
least degree objective and uniform.' 1 4 While the law may be more
predictable and more easily administered through the use of objec-
tive standards, justice must, in the kinds of cases considered here,
rest upon subjectivity, a fitting of the remedy to the immediate
circumstances. Labor relations have been trial and error matters
initially, labor was suppressed, the anti-injunction statutes swung
the balance over, Taft-Hartley attempted to bring the pointer back
to mid-point, support has been rallied to modify that measure be-
cause it may have once again swung the balance too far against
labor.12
5
The situation of the self-employer before Hanke seemed rather
precarious, for he was being pinched between the pressures of his
large and financially stronger competitors on the one side and union
demands leading to higher operating costs on the other side. Since
the labor union is now accepted as a secure, distinct and important
institution, a shift in emphasis from protection of labor to protection
of the self-employed person may provide needed economic balance.
123. Some of these factors were expressly considered in Hath v.
Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, Local 170, 290 S.W.2d 152 (Mo.
1956).
124. Tanenhaus, supra note 50, at 48.
125. Nation's Business, Dec. 1956, p. 25.
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